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Abstract
Using a large dataset of research seminars held at US economics departments in
2018, I explore the factors that determine who is invited to present at a research seminar
and whether the invitation is accepted. I find that high-quality scholars have a higher
probability of being invited than low-quality scholars, and researchers are more likely
to accept an invitation if it is issued by a top economics department. The probability of
being invited increases with the size of the host department and if the scholar belongs to
it. Having a coauthor in the host department increases the probability of being invited
and accepting the invitation, whereas the distance between the host department and
invited scholar reduces the probability of being invited and accepting the invitation.
Female scholars have a lower probability of being invited to give a research seminar
than male scholars.
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1 Introduction
To develop new ideas, scholars need to be aware of the state-of-the-art in the field and discuss
their new research projects with peers. Research seminars contribute to the achievement of
both objectives. Thus, university departments devote a considerable amount of resources
to organize research seminars, and scholars invest a substantial share of time in preparing
presentations and traveling to other universities. However, despite its being a core activity
of academic life, little is known about the variables determining who is invited to deliver a
research seminar and whether a scholar will accept the invitation to present.
I build a large dataset of research seminars held at US economics departments in 2018. In
my sample, I only observe whether a scholar gives a seminar at an economics department. I do
not observe whether a department invites a scholar to deliver a seminar or whether a scholar
accepts the invitation, but the product of these individual decisions. Despite this limitation, I
can estimate the variables governing the decision to invite and accept using a bivariate probit
model with partial observability. I find that high-quality scholars are more likely to be invited
to deliver a research seminar and that scholars are more likely to accept an invitation to give
a seminar if it is issued by a top department. These results suggest a positive assortative
matching in seminars between the quality of the inviting department and the quality of the
invited scholar. This matching may reinforce the quality advantage of ex-ante high-quality
scholars and departments. In my preferred specification, I find that women have a lower
probability to be invited to deliver a research seminar than men. Scholars are more likely to
be invited by a large department and are more likely to accept an invitation if they have a
coauthor in the inviting department. A long distance between the inviting department and
affiliation of the invited scholar reduces the probability of issuing and accepting an invitation
to deliver a research seminar. A scholar belonging to the department that hosts the seminar
has a larger probability of being invited and accepting the invitation than a scholar not
belonging to the department. Departments prefer to invite young scholars.
To the best of my knowledge, the paper is the first to provide evidence on the variables
that determine (i) the scholars invited to deliver a research seminar, and (ii) where a scholar
is more likely to present a research seminar. Previous papers concluded that workshops
and conferences facilitate the transmission of knowledge (Iaria et al., 2018; Lopez de Leon
and McQuillin, 2018; Head et al., 2019), promote collaboration among scholars (Campos
et al., 2018; Chai and Freeman, 2019), increase the probability of publishing in high-quality
journals (Gorodnichenko et al., 2019) and the quality of research (Minondo, 2020). I add to
the literature by showing that high-quality departments are more likely to be aware of new
knowledge generated in the field, because scholars producing the most promising ideas are
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more willing to present their new projects to such departments. Previous studies on urban
economics, economic growth, and economics of innovation have shown that social interac-
tions enable people to be exposed to new ideas, thus raising knowledge and fostering the
development of new ideas (Lucas, 2009; Glaeser, 2011; De la Roca and Puga, 2017; Akcigit
et al., 2018; Andrews, 2019). Research seminars provide scholars with exposure to new ideas
and facilitate interaction among peers. I contribute to the literature by analyzing the vari-
ables that raise the probability that a research seminar takes place and thus, foster awareness
about new ideas and interaction among scholars. In general, this paper is related to the lit-
erature that explores the productivity and quality determinants of economics scholars and
departments (Kim et al., 2009; Bosquet and Combes, 2017; Hamermesh, 2018). I contribute
to this literature by showing that research seminars may further enhance the productivity
of high-quality scholars affiliated with high-quality departments, because such scholars will
have more opportunities to be aware of new ideas and improve their research projects on the
basis of the comments and suggestions from high-quality peers. Finally, I join several studies
in analyzing gender discrimination in economics (Ginther and Kahn, 2004; Bayer and Rouse,
2016; Lundberg and Stearns, 2019; Hengel and Moon, 2019; Card et al., 2020). I add to the
literature by providing evidence that female scholars are less likely to be invited to deliver a
research seminar.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 posits a simple analytical
framework to understand the factors that motivate departments to organize research sem-
inars and scholars to present at a research seminar. Section 3 describes the dataset and
presents some summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the results of the regression analyses,
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Simple analytical framework on research seminars
To guide the empirical analysis I posit a very simple analytical framework to explain the fac-
tors that determine the scholars invited to deliver a research seminar and the reasons that
lead a scholar to accept such an invitation. To produce high-quality research, university
departments should be aware of new ideas, methodologies and databases in their field. A
strategy for remaining at the frontier of knowledge is inviting the scholars who are generating
new ideas and methodologies and using such novel databases. Research seminars are espe-
cially helpful for increasing awareness of cutting-edge research, because the presenters may
have yet to publish a working paper of the new research project, and the new knowledge may
still be tacit. Even when a working paper exists, oral presentations and discussions between
3
the presenter and attendees may clarify certain aspects of the paper (Chai and Freeman,
2019).
A department holds a limit on the number of research seminars that it can host during
an academic course; thus, it will aim to maximize the research quality of the presenters
given the budget. I assume that departments only observe the quality of the scholar and
give freedom to decide the paper that will be presented. I define a latent variable I∗ds, which
measures the willingness of department d to invite scholar s to deliver a research seminar.
Analytically:
I∗ds = β1Qs + β2Costds + β3Sized + β4Females + β5Coauthords+
β6Ownds + ds
(1)
In addition to researcher’s quality, Qs, other factors may also determine a department’s
willingness to invite a scholar. For example, departments may be less willing to invite a
scholar if travel expenses are high, Costds. Large departments, Sized, are more likely to
invite scholars because they can hold a large number of seminars.
A recent survey of the American Economic Association indicated that 32% of women, as
opposed to 13% of men, felt discriminated or unfairly treated in terms of being invited to
participate in research conferences, associations and networks (American Economic Associ-
ation, 2019). Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham (2017) found that the rate of paper acceptance
at the NBER Summer Institute for women is statistically indistinguishable from that for
men. However, Hospido and Sanz (2019) found that female-authored papers are less likely
to be accepted at three major academic conferences in economics.1 To capture potential gen-
der discrimination when inviting a speaker, I introduce a dummy variable, Females, which
takes a value of one if the speaker is female and zero otherwise. If the invited scholar has a
coauthor in the inviting department, Coauthords, then the inviting department may be more
willing to invite. In addition to having the opportunity to learn about the latest research
project of the invited scholar, the visit may enable coauthors to advance in the joint research
project. In addition, departments may be willing to provide a first venue for own scholars,
and researchers visiting the department, to discuss their new ideas. This possibility is cap-
tured by Ownds, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the invited scholar
1Regarding research seminars, The Econ Seminar Diversity project is gathering a database on who
spokes at economics departments seminar series, and it provides a tool to visualize the percentage of
women and scholars belonging to minorities that are invited to give a seminar. Available at https:
//econseminardiversity.shinyapps.io/EconSeminarDiversity/URL
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was affiliated to or visiting the department that issued the invitation, and zero otherwise.
ds is the disturbance term. A department will deliver an invitation to present a seminar if
the willingness to invite exceeds a given threshold λ. Thus, the probability that department
d invites scholar s is P(I∗ds > λ).
A scholar wants to present her research to high-quality audiences, where she is more likely
to receive suggestions and comments that may enable her to improve the quality of a new
project. Therefore, the probability that an author accepts an invitation to deliver a research
seminar will be high with a high-quality department issuing the invitation. The probability of
accepting the invitation may also depend on other variables, such as duration of the trip and
having a coauthor in the inviting department. Scholars may feel more comfortable presenting
their new work to their department peers than to peers in other departments. However, pre-
viously receiving comments from department peers through personal conversations may also
lessen the probability of scholars presenting at their department. The American Economic
Association survey reports that a larger percentage of women than men (46% vs. 18%) do
not speak at conferences or seminar presentations to avoid possible harassment, discrimina-
tion, or unfair or disrespectful treatment (American Economic Association, 2019). Lundberg
and Stearns (2019) noted that economics seminars have a reputation for being particularly
hostile environments. To capture the possibility that women may be less willing to accept an
invitation to deliver a seminar, I include Femalesd as an additional variable in Equation (2).
Finally, young scholars may be more willing to accept an invitation because they want to
present themselves to the research community (Chai and Freeman, 2019).
I define a latent variable A∗sd, which measures the willingness of scholar s to accept an
invitation to present a paper at department d. Analytically, A∗sd can be expressed as follows:
A∗sd = β1Qd + β2Tripsd + β3Females + β4Coauthorsd + β5Ages+
β6Ownsd + sd
(2)
where Qd denotes the quality of the inviting institution, Tripsd the duration of the trip,
Ages the career age of the scholar, and sd the disturbance term. Scholar s will accept the
invitation to deliver a research seminar at department d if the willingness to accept overcomes
a given threshold κ. Thus, the probability of accepting an invitation is P(A∗sd > κ).
A research seminar will take place if department d delivers an invitation to scholar s,
and scholar s accepts the invitation.2 Thus, the probability of holding a research seminar
2The process can flow in the opposite direction: a scholar may offer to deliver a seminar and the depart-
ment may accept the offer.
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by scholar s at department d, P(Ssd), can be expressed as follows:
P(Ssd) = P(I∗ds > λ,A∗sd > κ) (3)
The model has two binary outcomes, namely, Ids, which takes a value of one if I∗ds > λ, and
zero otherwise, and, Asd, which takes a value of one if A∗sd > κ, and zero otherwise. However,
my data only allow me to observe the product of these outcomes. I note that an invitation
was issued if the author accepts it; and I only observe the absence of a match. In the latter
case, I cannot determine whether the seminar did not occur because the department did not
issue the invitation or the scholar did not accept the invitation. Following Poirer (1980), the
partial observability problem can be represented by a single binary random variable:
Zds = IdsAsd (4)
The distribution of Zds is
pds = P(Zds = 1) = P(Ids = 1 and Asd = 1) = F (xIβI , xAβA; ρ),
1− pds = P(Zds = 0) = P(Ids = 0 or Asd = 0) = 1− F (xIβI , xAβA; ρ)
(5)
where F denotes the bivariate standard normal distribution and ρ the correlation of the
error terms (i.e., ds and sd). xIβI and xAβA are the variables and parameters included in
Equations (1) and (2), respectively.
The log-likelihood function of the sample is expressed as follows:
L(βI , βA, ρ) =
n∑
d=1
n∑
s=1
Zds ln[F (xIβI , xAβA; ρ)]
+(1− Zds) ln[1− F (xIβI , xAβA; ρ)]
(6)
Poirer (1980) showed that βI and βA can be estimated if, at least, one variable included
in one of the variable vectors, xI or xA, is excluded from the other variable vector. In my
model, Qs and Sized, which are included in xI , are excluded from xA. In addition, Qd, which
is included in xA, is excluded from xI . Hence, estimating all parameters included in βI and
βA with a bivariate probit model with partial observability is possible.
The partial bivariate model assumes a correlation between the errors terms (i.e., ds, sd)
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in Equations (1) and (2) This assumption is reasonable in the said context. For example, a
department may not issue an invitation if it is very unlikely that a scholar will accept the
invitation. Therefore, willingness to accept an invitation (κ) is a factor that can determine
the willingness to issue an invitation (λ), which leads to a correlation between errors terms.
I argue that the regression equation incorporates the variables critical for the decisions
that I am modeling. Obviously, other variables may also affect the probability of holding a
seminar. For example, if a scholar is ill, she will be unable to accept the invitation to deliver
a seminar. Conversely, if a department is located in an area that suffered an earthquake,
it may be unable to host seminars until the faculty buildings are repaired. However, these
factors are orthogonal to the variables included in the model, and their omission should not
affect the estimates.
Identification in bivariate probit models with partial observability is weaker than that in
bivariate models with full information about individual decisions (Meng and Schmidt, 1985).
This is because the model has to estimate the parameters of two decisions from events that
are incompletely observed. To test the robustness of results, I estimate a univariate probit
model which combines the variables that affect the probability of inviting and accepting an
invitation. The regression equation is expressed as follows:
S∗sd = β1Qs + β2Qd + β3Costds + β4Females + β5Coauthords + β6Ownds+
β7Sized + β8Ages + ds
(7)
Scholar s will hold a seminar at department d (Ssd = 1) if the latent variable S∗sd is higher
than a given threshold µ. If the latent variable does not overcome such a threshold, then
seminar will not take place (Ssd = 0).
3 Data
I randomly selected 146 economics departments out of the 240 economics programs included
in Table 1 of McPherson (2012). The randomly selected departments for the current study
are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix.3 From the departments’ web pages, I extracted
information about seminars held in 2018, such as the invited scholar, affiliation of the invited
scholar, and, if available, the title of the paper that was presented.4 I include a department
3I sampled up to 157 departments, but 11 of them could not be included in the sample due to limitations
in retrieving the required information.
4I do not include the recruitment seminars or the seminars delivered by PhD students in the sample.
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in the sample even if it did not hold any research seminar in 2018. The sample of scholars is
composed of professors affiliated with the 240 US economics departments included in Table 1
of McPherson (2012).5 The estimation sample is generated by crossing the randomly selected
departments with the sample of scholars.
I use the index elaborated by McPherson (2012) to proxy for the quality of US economics
departments. This index is based on the number of pages published by a department’s
scholars in the top 50 economics journals during 2002-2009. I use two measures to proxy
for the quality of the invited scholar, namely, (i) quality of the economics department to
which the scholar is affiliated; and (ii) number of citations to the scholar’s research outputs
according to her profile in Google Scholar. I use the same variable to capture the cost of
inviting a scholar, Costds, and length of the trip, Tripsd, that is, the distance between the
inviting department and affiliation of the invited scholar.6 Using information from Google
Scholar, I identify whether the invited scholar has a coauthor in the inviting department. To
calculate the career age of the scholar, I identify her earliest publication in Google Scholar.
I calculate career age as 2018 minus the year in which the earliest work was published, plus
one. I measure the size of an economics department by the number of professors affiliated
with it.
Table 1: Building of sample and summary statistics
Number of US economics departments in the random sample 146
which held at least one research seminar in 2018 93
Number of scholars affiliated with a US economics department 4,853
Female 1,122
With a Google Scholar ID 2,946
Number of observations in the estimation sample 708,538
Number of seminars 3,942
Number of scholars presenting at a seminar 2,842
Affiliated with a US economics department 1,065
Female 212
Median Mean Std. dev. Min Max
# Seminars per department 8.5 27.0 45.4 0 261
# Seminars per scholar 0.0 0.4 0.9 0 7
Note: Author’s calculations.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the sample. The number of US economics
5I do not include emeritus professors or joint appointments.
6I calculate bilateral distances using the latitude and longitude of the inviting department and affiliation
of the invited scholar.
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departments included in our sample is 146, out of which 93 held at least one seminar in
2018. The number of scholars affiliated with a US economics department was 4,853, out of
which 1122 were female (23%). The crossing of the randomly sampled departments (146) and
scholars affiliated with US economics departments (4,853) generates an estimation sample of
708,538 observations. I retrieved data from 3942 seminars held by economics departments
included in the sample. The number of scholars presenting at least one research seminar
was 2,842, out of which 1065 were affiliated with a US economics department. A total of
212 of the latter speakers were female (20%). The remainder of the seminars were delivered
by scholars affiliated with non-US economics departments or institutions, scholars affiliated
with business schools, law schools, and other non-economics departments in US universities,
or scholars belonging to other US institutions (for example, federal reserve banks). The
number of scholars affiliated with a US economics department that had a Google Scholar ID
was 2,946 (61%).
The bottom panel of Table 1 indicates that the median department held 8.5 seminars in
2018. However, the distribution of seminars per department was highly skewed, because the
average number of seminars was 27 and the standard deviation 45. A total of 53 departments
did not hold any seminar in 2018, whereas one department held up to 261 seminars. The
median number of seminars per scholar was zero. This distribution was also skewed as
indicated by the average number of seminars per scholar of 0.4 and a standard deviation of
0.9. In total, 3,788 scholars did not present at a research seminar, whereas other scholars
presented at seven economics departments in 2018.
Panel A in Figure 1 shows a positive correlation between the quality of the economics
department and number of research seminars held by that department. The number of
research seminars increases exponentially with the quality of the economics department.
Panel B in Figure 1 plots the correlation between the quality of scholars and number of
seminars delivered in 2018. The vertical axis measures the number of seminars, which ranges
from 0 to 7 (Table 1). Each dot in the graph corresponds to a scholar. For each number of
seminars, the quality-range of scholars is very wide. However, the average quality of scholars
increases (i.e., the line of dots moves to the right) as the number of seminars delivered by a
scholar increases. These figures suggest that research seminars are more likely to occur if the
quality of the host department and invited scholar is high. The regression analyses carried
out in the next section analyze whether this visual appreciation is correct.
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Figure 1: Correlation between quality and number of seminars, 2018
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Note: The quality of economics departments is measured by McPherson’s (2012) index (in logs). The quality
of scholars is measured by the (log) number of citations to works recorded by Google Scholar between 2013
and 2017.
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4 Regression results
This section presents the results of econometric analyses. To maximize the number of obser-
vations, I first proxy for the quality of the invited scholar by the quality of the department
to which she is affiliated. The shortcoming of this estimation is that I cannot include career
age and coauthor as independent variables because they can only be computed for authors
with a Google Scholar profile.
Column (1) of Table 2 presents the baseline estimation. Standard errors are clustered
at the scholar level. At the bottom of the table, I report the chi-square statistics for the
likelihood ratio test that the correlation between the error terms is zero. The null hypothesis
of the absence of correlation is strongly rejected. The probability that a scholar is invited
to deliver a research seminar increases with the quality of the department to which she
is affiliated. This result is in line with the prediction that departments seek to invite high-
quality scholars to deliver a seminar. In turn, scholars are more likely to accept an invitation
if it is issued by a high-quality department. This result is also in line with the prediction
that scholars aim to present their papers to high-quality audiences. Gender (i.e., being
a female) does not reduce neither the probability of being invited nor the probability of
accepting an invitation. Larger departments have a higher probability to invite than smaller
departments. Distance has a negative effect on the probability to invite and accept. In
addition, departments prefer to invite their own scholars. Researchers are more willing to
accept an invitation when it is issued by their department than when it is issued by another
department, although the coefficient is imprecisely estimated.
I use the coefficients in column (1) to quantify the changes in the probability of being
invited and accepting the invitation as I vary the value of the variables included in the model.
For example, the probability that a scholar affiliated with Yale, a department that occupies
the 10th position in the quality ranking, is invited to deliver a seminar at Stanford is 227
times larger than if the scholar was affiliated with Richmond, a university at a similar distance
from Stanford, but which occupies the 194th position in the quality ranking. Likewise, the
probability that a scholar affiliated with Stanford accepts an invitation from Yale is 269 times
larger than the probability of accepting an invitation from Richmond. A scholar affiliated
with Berkeley has a 2.5 times higher probability to be invited by Stanford than a scholar from
MIT, a department that has a similar quality-ranking as Berkeley, but is much farther from
Stanford. Likewise, a scholar from Berkeley has a 2.8 times higher probability of accepting
an invitation from Stanford than a scholar from MIT. Finally, the probability that a scholar
from Stanford in invited to deliver a seminar by her department is six times higher than if
she were affiliated with Berkeley, which is a university close to Stanford in geographical and
11
Table 2: Probability to invite and accept. Scholars’ quality measured by affiliation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Own scholar
excluded
RePEc Active hosts
&presenters
Probability to invite
Scholar quality 0.441a 0.432a 0.531a 0.283a
(0.020) (0.019) (0.042) (0.025)
Department size 0.418a 0.436a 0.583a 0.310b
(0.140) (0.135) (0.159) (0.137)
Female 0.016 0.014 0.054 0.015
(0.049) (0.048) (0.070) (0.047)
Distance -0.106a -0.098a -0.069a -0.129a
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Own scholar 2.070a 2.856a 0.928a
(0.242) (0.250) (0.129)
Probability to accept
Department’s quality 0.456a 0.511a 0.410a 0.337a
(0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.012)
Female 0.011 0.027 -0.024 0.040
(0.040) (0.048) (0.056) (0.026)
Distance -0.124a -0.136a -0.075a -0.132a
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)
Own department 0.132 0.299a 0.461a
(0.099) (0.093) (0.091)
Log Pseudolikelihood -9619.042 -8813.460 -8173.259 -7550.875
Observations 708538 705603 221680 96300
Test ρ=0 91.088 68.540 126.884 2.335
Note: Constants are not reported. Standard errors clustered at the scholar level are in parentheses. a, b, c:
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
quality terms.
I perform additional analyses to test the robustness of the results. First, I exclude
the observations in which the seminar presenter belongs to the host department from the
sample. Arguably, the nature of some of these seminars (for example, brown bag) are different
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from regular research seminars, because the former are focused on PhD students and are
attended by a smaller number of professors than regular seminars. The estimates reported
in column (2) of Table 2 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the
baseline estimation. The only major difference lies in the quality of the inviting department
coefficient, whose value is larger than that in column (1).
Second, I use the quality ranking of US economics departments elaborated by Ideas as
an alternative measure for the quality of the invited scholar and inviting department.7 Ideas
only provides the ranking for the top 25% US economics departments, which is a list that
covers 132 institutions. This list includes not only traditional economics departments, but
also economics departments belonging to business or other schools. The smaller number of
departments included in the alternative quality than in McPherson’s (2012) ranking leads to a
reduction in the number of observations. The quality coefficients for the inviting department
and invited scholar remain positive and very precisely estimated (column (3) of Table 2). An
increase in the size of the department coefficient’s value is noted. In contrast, a reduction
in the negative value of the distance coefficients is observed. Finally, the coefficients of own
scholar have larger values and are precisely estimated.
Third, I aim to test whether or not the results are robust to removing the departments
without seminars and scholars that did not present at any seminar from the sample. Column
(4) of Table 2 presents the results. The estimates should be taken with caution because
the estimation algorithm did not converge. With this caveat in mind, the estimates are
qualitatively similar to those obtained in the baseline analysis. As expected, a drop occurred
in the value of scholar’s quality and department’s quality coefficients due to the sample
selection. However, these coefficients are positive and precisely estimated.
In the second set of estimations, I measure the quality of the invited scholar by the
number of citations to her work. This measure is deemed a better proxy for the quality of a
scholar than her affiliation because of heterogeneity in the quality of scholars, as measured
by citations, within economics departments (Hamermesh, 2018). The information retrieved
from the Google Scholar profiles also enables me to include coauthor ties and career age as
additional explanatory variables of the decisions to invite and accept. The "cost" of using
these new data is a sizable reduction in the number of observations.
I expect departments to be more interested in inviting scholars that are actively producing
high-quality research than inactive scholars. To capture this fact, I proxy for the quality of
a scholar by the number of citations to her works in the five-year period, that is, 2013-2017,
7I use the ranking published in May 2019. The latest ranking is available at https://ideas.repec.org/
top/top.usecondept.html
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prior to the seminars’ data year of 2018. Hamermesh (2018) revealed that scholars with
longer careers receive more citations than junior scholars. To control for this effect, I add
career age as an additional variable when estimating the probability to invite. To identify
coauthor ties that are more likely to be "alive", I define two scholars as coauthors if they
published a joint paper in the five-year period prior to 2018.8
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the baseline estimates. The chi-square coefficient reported
at the bottom of the table confirms the correlation between errors terms. A high-quality
scholar, proxied by the (log) number of citations to her papers between 2013 and 2017, has a
larger probability of being invited to present a research seminar than a low-quality scholar.
In turn, scholars are more likely to accept an invitation if it is issued by a high-quality
department. These results confirm the positive assortative matching in research seminars
between high-quality scholars and high-quality departments.
Large departments are more willing to invite scholars. Distance has a negative effect on
the probability to invite and accept, although the impact is stronger on the latter. Depart-
ments are more likely to invite their own scholars, and scholars are more willing to accept
an invitation if it comes from their department, although this latter coefficient is imprecisely
estimated. Furthermore, departments are more willing to invite young scholars. In contrast,
there is no relation between career age and probability of accepting an invitation. Having a
coauthor in the host department raises the probabilities of being invited and accepting the
invitation.
When the quality of a scholar is measured by the number of citations to her works in
the previous five years, female scholars have a lower probability to be invited to deliver a
research seminar than male scholars. This result suggests that inviting departments set a
higher quality-bar for female scholars than for male scholars. This result is in line with Card
et al. (2020) who found that journal referees set a higher bar for female-authored papers
than for male-authored papers, and Hengel and Moon (2019) who showed that the quality
of female-authored papers are higher than male-authored papers in the ”top-five” economics
journals. Female scholars are more willing to accept an invitation, but the coefficient is not
precisely estimated.9
I use the coefficients in column (1) of Table 3 to explore how variations in the value of
the independent variables alter the probability of inviting and accepting an invitation. For
example, a male scholar with no coauthors in the inviting department, a median career age
8Estimations, not reported, are robust to using total citations and coauthor ties before 2013.
9In unreported estimations, I find that the difference in the female coefficient in the probability to invite
relative to column (1) of Table 2 is not the result of using a different sample. The new result is explained
by the use of a more accurate quality measure and adding career age and coauthor ties to the specification.
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(17 years), affiliated to an east-coast university (for example, Yale), and at the top 80% of
the five-year citation distribution (1,466 citations) has a 3.7 times higher probability to be
invited by Stanford than a male scholar, with no coauthors in Stanford, same career age,
affiliated with the same east-coast university, but located at the top 20% of the citation
distribution (57 citations). Likewise, a male scholar affiliated to a west-coast university (for
example, Stanford), with no coauthors in the inviting department, median career age, and
at the top 80% of the five-year citation distribution is 1,756 times more likely to accept an
invitation to give a seminar at Yale than at Richmond.
A male scholar affiliated with an east-coast university and the top 80% of the citation
distribution has a 37% higher probability to be invited by Stanford than a female scholar
affiliated with the same university and with the same number of citations. A male scholar
affiliated with an east-coast university, and at the top 80% of the citation distribution has a
1.8 times higher probability to be invited by Stanford if he has a coauthor in that department
relative to another east-coast university male scholar with the same quality ranking without
a coauthor at Stanford. Likewise, a male scholar from an east-coast university has a 3.2
times larger probability of accepting an invitation from Stanford if he has a coauthor in that
department than without. A male scholar at the top 80% who is affiliated with Berkeley
has a 2.5 times higher probability of being invited to deliver a seminar at Stanford than a
similarly ranked male scholar from MIT. Likewise, a male scholar from Berkeley has a 2.7
times higher probability to accept an invitation from Stanford than a male scholar from
MIT. Finally, the probability that a top 80% scholar from Stanford delivers a seminar in his
department is 3.7 times higher than if he were affiliated with Berkeley.
I perform additional analyses to test the robustness of the results. First, I re-estimate
Equation (3) by omitting the observations in which the scholar belongs to the inviting de-
partment from the sample (column (2)). The estimates are quantitatively and qualitatively
similar to the baseline estimations. The only noticeable difference lies in the coauthor coef-
ficient, whose value increases in the probability to invite decision. Second, I use the Ideas
quality ranking as a substitute for McPherson’s (2012) measure of economics department’s
quality. The coefficient for the quality of the economics department (column (3)) is much
larger than the baseline estimation (column (1)). A sizable increase is noted on the coauthor
coefficient in the acceptance decision relative to the baseline estimate. The female coefficient
in the decision to invite remains negative. However, it is statistically non-significant.
Third, I remove the departments that did not hold any seminar and scholars that did not
deliver any seminar in 2018 from the sample (column (4)). Despite the very large reduction
in the number of observations, the model converges. As expected, the quality coefficients for
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the presenter and host department have lower values than those in the baseline estimation
and are much less precisely estimated. The female coefficient in the decision to invite is
negative and statistically significant. Female scholars that presented at least one research
seminar are more willing to accept an invitation than male scholars that presented at least
one seminar. Distance reduces the probability to invite, but does not affect the probability
to accept. Paradoxically, having a coauthor in the host department reduces the probability
to be invited. Having a coauthor in the host department raises the probability to accept,
but the coefficient is not precisely estimated.
Fourth, previous papers showed that female scholars are not evenly distributed across
fields (Dolado et al., 2012; Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2017; Card et al., 2020). If
female scholars are concentrated in fields were seminars are less common, we could find
that women have a lower probability of being invited to deliver a seminar, even if there
was no gender discrimination. To rule out this possibility, we estimate the model only with
scholars whose main research line is any of the five fields in which the presence of female
researchers is largest: health, education, and welfare (JEL code I); labor and demographics
economics (JEL code J); economic history (JEL code N); industrial organization (JEL code
L); and economic development and growth (JEL code O).10 The female coefficient in the
probability of being invited decision remains negative and statistically significant (column
(5) of Table 3).
Identification in a partially observable biprobit model is weaker than in a model where
both individual decisions are observable. To test the robustness of the results, I estimate
a univariate probit model where the only decision is whether or not to hold a seminar
(Equation (3)). Table 4 presents the results. In column (1), I approximate the quality of
a scholar by the quality of her affiliation. The quality of the scholar and quality of the
economics department are positively correlated with the probability of holding a seminar.
Distance between the invited scholar and invited department reduces the probability of
holding a seminar. If the speaker belongs to the host department, then the probability of
holding a seminar increases. The size of the department has a positive sign, but the coefficient
is imprecisely estimated. The coefficient for female scholars is nearly zero, which indicates
that gender does not have an effect on the probability of holding a seminar. These results are
consistent with those obtained from the partially observable bivariate probit model (column
(1) of Table 2).
10The selection of the top 5 fields is based on Dolado et al. (2012)-Figure 1. To determine a scholar’s main
research field, we compute the JEL codes of the articles and working papers written by the scholar between
2015 and 2019. We retrieve this information from RePEc. The main research field is the one corresponding
to the most repeated JEL 1-digit code.
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Column (2) presents the results of estimating Equation (3) when the quality of the pre-
senter is measured by the number of citations to her works in the previous five years. The
probability of holding a seminar increases with the quality of the scholar and inviting de-
partment. If the presenter has a coauthor in the inviting department, then the probability
of holding a seminar increases. A seminar has a lower probability of taking place when the
scholar is old and if a large distance is observed between the invited scholar and inviting
department. Seminars have a higher probability of taking place if the presenter belongs to
the department. Larger departments have a higher probability of holding a seminar, but
the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. The coefficient for female scholars is negative, but
statistically non-significant. For most coefficients, the results are consistent with those ob-
tained from a partially observable bivariate probit model (column (1) in Table 3). Regarding
the female variable, the bivariate probit results yielded a negative and precisely estimated
coefficient for the probability to invite, whereas it presented a positive but imprecisely esti-
mated coefficient for the probability to accept. These opposing signs may explain why I find
a negative but imprecisely estimated coefficient in the univariate probit estimation.
5 Conclusions
The paper explores the variables that determine who is invited to deliver a research seminar
and where scholars want to present their new research projects. I find that the probability of
being invited to present at a research seminar is positively correlated with the quality of the
scholar, and scholars are more likely to accept an invitation if it is issued by a high-quality
department. I also show that the geographical distance between departments and scholars
reduces the probability of being invited and accepting the invitation. In contrast, having
a coauthor in the host department raises the probability of being invited and accepting
the invitation. Departments prefer to invite young scholars and researchers that belong to
their department. In my preferred specification, I find that female scholars have a lower
probability of being invited to deliver a research seminar than male scholars.
These results suggest that scholars affiliated with high-quality departments have more
opportunities to listen to high-quality scholars and increase awareness of the state-of-the-
art in the field, enabling to endow their new research with advanced ideas, methodologies,
and databases. In turn, high-quality scholars have additional opportunities to improve their
papers because they are more likely to receive comments and suggestions from other high-
quality scholars. The positive assortative matching in seminars between high-quality depart-
ments and high-quality scholars provides top departments and scholars a tool to retain their
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leading positions. Low-quality departments and scholars can compensate for this disadvan-
tage if they are located close to high-quality departments or if they have coauthor ties with
top scholars.
Results also indicate that female scholars are at a disadvantage relative to male scholars.
Research seminars are a very important tool to present a scholarly output and to receive
feedback. Thus, economics departments should implement a gender-neutral policy when
issuing invitations for scholars to deliver research seminars.
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Table A.1: Economics departments included in the seminar sample
Ranking Institution Seminars included # of
semi-
nars
1 Harvard The Monetary and Fiscal Policy Seminar; The Political Economy of Religion
Seminar; The Public Economics and Fiscal Policy Seminar; The Law,
Economics, and Organizations Workshop; Economics of Science and
Engineering Workshop; The International Economics Workshop; The
Program on Political Economy; Industrial Organization Workshop;
Behavioral & Experimental Economics Workshop, The Economic
Development Workshop; Health Economics Workshop; The Theory
Workshop; The Econometrics Workshop; The Economic History Workshop;
The Labor Workshop; Seminar in Macroeconomic Policy; Seminar in
Behavioral and Experimental Economics; Seminar in Public Economics and
Fiscal Policy; Seminar in Economic Theory; Seminar in Econometrics;
Seminar in Monetary and Fiscal Policy; Seminar in Industrial Organization;
Seminar in Economic History; Seminar in Law, Economics, & Organization;
Seminar in Financial Economics; Seminar in Environmental Economics and
Policy; Seminar in Labor Economics. Some seminars were organized jointly
with MIT
211
2 Chicago Applications Workshop; Econometrics Workshop; Money&Banking
Workshop; Workshop in Economic Theory; Workshop in Family Economics
73
4 MIT Applied Microeconomics Seminar; Development Economics Seminar;
Econometrics Workshop; Economics IAP; Finance Seminar; IO Workshop;
International Seminar; Macro Seminar; Program on Political Economy;
Public Finance/Labor Workshop; Seminar in Organizational Economics;
Special Events; Theory Workshop. Some seminars were organized jointly
with MIT
180
5 Stanford Arrow Lectures; Department Seminar; Joint Applied Micro Seminar;
Development; Econometrics; Experimental Behavioral Seminar; Economics
Brown Bag Lunch Series; GSB Economic Theory; GSB Finance; GSB
Organizational Behavior Seminars; GSB Political Economy; Industrial
Organization; International Trade; Labor; Law and Economics;
Macroeconomics; Public Economics and Environmental Economics; SIEPR
Social Science and Technology
261
7 Northwestern Applied Micro Lunch; Development Economics Lunch Seminar;
Development Lunch Seminar; Joint CET/CMS - EMS Theory Workshop;
Macroeconomics Lunch Seminar; Seminar in Applied Microeconomics
(Development, Labor and Public Economics); Seminar in Econometrics;
Seminar in Economic History; Seminar in Industrial Organization; Seminar
in Macroeconomics; Theory Bag Lunch
107
8 Penn Econometrics Lunch; Econometrics Seminar; Empirical Micro Seminar;
Industrial Organization Seminar; Macro Lunch; Micro Theory Lunch; Micro
Theory Seminar; Money Macro Seminar
96
10 Yale The Behavioral Sciences Workshop; Cowles Lunch Talks; Development
Lunch; Development Workshop; Econometrics Seminar; Economic History
Workshop; International Trade Lunch; Labor/Public Economics Workshop;
Labor/Public Economics Prospectus Workshop; Industrial Organization
Seminar; ISPS Event; Leitner Political Economy Seminar; Macro Lunch;
Macroeconomics Workshop; Microeconomic Theory Workshop; Micro
Theory Lunch; Partner Event; Simon Kuznets Lecture; Wasserman
Workshop in Law and Finance; YLS Center for the Study of Corporate Law
200
Continued on the next page
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Ranking Institution Seminars included # of
semi-
nars
11 Michigan Abraham and Thelma Zwerdling Lecture; Applied Microeconomics/IO
Seminar; Causal Inference in Education Research Seminar; Econometrics;
Economic Development Seminar; Economic History; Economic Theory;
Health, History, Demography & Development; International Economics;
Interdisciplinary Seminar in Quantitative Methods; Labor Economics; Law
and Economics Workshop; Macroeconomics; Public Finance; Social,
Behavioral & Experimental Economics; W.S. Woytinsky Lecture
136
12 Princeton Behavioral Economics; CHW-RPDS; Griswold Center Event; Industrial
Organization; Department Wide Seminars; Industrial Relations;
International Trade; Macro/International Macro; Microeconomic Theory;
Oskar Morgenstern Memorial Seminar; Political Economy Workshop;
Simpson Lecture; Summer Seminar Series
131
13 UCLA Albert Family Fund Seminar in Applied Microeconomics; Vongremp
Workshop in Economic and Entrepreneurial History; Workshop in
Econometrics; Workshop in Economic Theory; Laub Foundation Workshop
in Industrial Organization; Ettinger Fund Workshop in Macroeconomics;
Workshop in Trade, Economic Geography and Development
95
16 Maryland Econometrics; IO/Theory; Labor/Public Finance/Development;
Macroeconomics/International Finance; Trade/Institutions/Politics
84
18 UC San Diego Applied Seminar Series; Econometrics Seminars Series; Int/Dev Seminar
series; Macro Seminar Series; Metrics Seminar Series; Theory Seminar Series
81
19 Wisconsin-Madison Robert E. Baldwin International Workshop; Joseph Krislov Labor
Workshop; Juli Plant Grainger Econometrics Workshop; Juli Plant Grainger
Industrial Organization Workshop; Juli Plant Grainger Macroeconomics
Seminar; Juli Plant Grainger Public Workshop; Juli Plant Grainger Theory
Workshop
64
21 Ohio State Applied Microeconomics Seminar; Econometrics Seminar; Economic
Theory/Experimental Seminar; Macroeconomics Seminar
69
22 Minnesota Agricultural and Applied Economics Seminar; Applied Micro; Department
Seminar; Environmental and Resource Economics Seminar; Fed Bag Lunch;
Finance Department Seminar; Jon Goldstein Memorial Lecture; Math Econ
Seminar; Micro-Macro Seminar; Minnesota Economics Seminar; Minnesota
Lecture; MPC Seminar Series; Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship
Seminar; Trade and Development Seminar
174
24 UC Davis Behavioral; Development; Econometrics; Economic History; Energy;
Environmental Economics; Industrial Organization; Macro/International
Economics; Public Finance-Labor; Theory
128
26 Carnegie Mellon Not available
27 Dartmouth Dartmouth IO Winter Conference; Economics Seminars; Household Finance
Seminar; International Seminar
40
28 Rochester Applied Workshop; International Workshop; Jones Lecture; Macro
Workshop; McKenzie Lecture; Theory Workshop
47
30 Penn State Applied Micro; Macroeconomics; Econometrics; Trade and Development;
Micro Theory
85
31 Iowa State Charles Sivesind Memorial Lecture; Department Seminars; George A. Fuller
Memorial Lecture; I.W. Arthur Memorial Seminar; Pioneer Policy Lecture;
William G. Murray Memorial Seminar
26
32 North Carolina Economics Seminars 60
Continued on the next page
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Ranking Institution Seminars included # of
semi-
nars
34 Vanderbilt Applied Economics; Departmental Macro; Departmental Micro;
Econometrics; Economic History; Empirical Micro; Health; International;
Political Economy
59
36 Boston College Applied Microeconomics Seminar; Econometrics Seminar; Macroeconomics
and Financial Economics Seminar; Macroeconomics Lunch; Microeconomics
Seminar
85
38 UC Irvine Econometrics Seminar; Labor-Public Seminar; Macroeconomics Seminar;
Theory, History and Development Seminar; Transportation, Urban and IO
Seminar
54
39 Purdue Economics Seminar 33
45 Emory Department-wide;Econometrics; Lunch&Learn;Macroeconomics;
Microeconomics
21
46 Arizona State Economic Seminars 60
47 George Mason ICES Experimental Economics Brown Bag Lecture; Micro-Economic Policy
Seminar; Public Choice Seminar; Seminars; Washington Area Economic
History Seminar; Workshop in Philosophy, Politics & Economics
53
49 Pittsburgh Seminars 96
50 Rutgers Econometrics; Empirical Microeconomics; Macroeconomic Theory; Micro
Theory/Experimental Seminar; Money, History and Finance
56
51 University of
Washington
Econometrics; International Economics and Macroeconomics; Joint Seminar
in Development Economics Series; Microeconomics
33
52* Colorado Could only retrieve data for Spring Series
54 Iowa No seminar series
56 Georgia Economics Seminar Series 24
57 North Carolina State Macro Seminar Series; NCSU Econometrics Workshop; Microeconomics
Workshop Series
18
58 Houston Macroeconomics Series; Empirical Microeconomics Series 39
60 Rice Brown Bag Seminars; Kalai Family Workshop in Applied Microeconomics;
Kalai Family Workshop in Business and Economics; Kalai Family Workshop
in Econometrics
48
61 UC Santa Cruz Brown Bag Seminars; Macroeconomics & International Finance Seminars;
Microeconomics & International Trade Seminars
50
62 Johns Hopkins Seminars 54
64 Oregon EC Seminar 17
68 Missouri Brown Bag Seminar; Regular Seminar 11
70 Brigham Young R2 Research; Visiting Scholar Seminar 20
72 Kentucky Seminars and Workshops 27
73 Connecticut Friday Econometrics Lunch; IO, Environmental, and Law Economics;
Labor, Development, and Health Economics; Macroeconomics;
53
74 Texas-Dallas No seminar series
75 Claremont McKenna RDS Seminar Series 11
76 Utah No seminar series
77 Wisconsin-Milwaukee Seminars in the Center for Research on International Economics and the
Department of Economics
19
81 Oregon State Applied Economics Seminar Series 5
83* Baruch College-CUNY Could only retrieve data for the 2018 Fall Series
87 Case Western Economics Research Seminar 8
91 Oklahoma Economics Research Seminar Series 23
93 Kansas Seminars 8
94 UC Riverside Applied Economics; Brown Bag; Econometrics; Economic Theory 71
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96 Drexel School of Economics Seminars 15
99 SUNY Albany Seminars 25
100 Williams College Economic Class of 1960 Scholars Seminar; Economics Department Seminar 24
102 Colorado-Denver Seminars 12
103 American University Research Seminar Series 27
106 Stony Brook Departmental Research Series 28
109 South Carolina No seminar series
111 West Virginia Economics Seminar Series 28
113 IUPUI Economic Theory Workshop; Health Economics Seminar; Robert Sandy
Economics Seminar
17
114 Auburn Friday Seminar Series 27
117 Brandeis Seminar Series 38
120* Swarthmore Not available
121 Nevada-Las Vegas No seminar series
122 Middlebury Economics Department Seminars 13
123 Mississippi Seminar series 9
124 Nebraska Economics Seminars 11
125 North Carolina -
Charlotte
Economics Seminars Series 11
126* Fordham Not available
127 Northeastern Research Seminars 19
129 Cal State-Fullerton Spring Seminar 4
130* Graduate Center
CUNY
132 San Diego State No seminar series
133 Florida Atlantic No seminar series in 2018
134 Texas Tech Free Market Institute’s Research Workshop 22
136 Texas Arlington No seminar series in 2018
137* Vermont Not available
138 UNC-Greensboro Economics Seminars 2
139 Wesleyan No seminar series in 2018
140 Bentley No seminar series
141 South Florida Seminar Series 11
142 Cincinnati Seminar Series 9
144 Miami-Ohio Could not retrieve data for Sping 2018 seminar series
145 Utah State Seminars 16
146 Baylor Seminars 6
147 Memphis Seminar Series 13
148 Hawaii Seminar Series 22
149 Temple No seminar series
150 Rhode Island No seminar series
152 Wake Forest Seminars 12
154 North Texas Department of Economics Seminar Series 2
156 Texas San Antonio No seminar series
158 Amherst No seminar series
161 Nebraska-Omaha No seminar series
162 Illinois State Economics Department Seminar Series;International Seminar Series;Applied
Econometrics Workshop;Econometrics Workshop;Seminars sponsored by the
Institute for Corruption Studies
15
163 Cal State-Sacramento No seminar series
Continued on the next page
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Ranking Institution Seminars included # of
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165 Villanova No seminar series
166 Occidental College No seminar series
167 Union College No seminar series
168 Towson Economics Department Seminar Series 4
171 Cal. Polytech State Seminar 4
172 San Houston State Seminar series 4
173 Middle Tennessee
State
No seminar series
174 New Hampshire Not available
175 Hamilton College No seminar series
176 Trinity University No seminar series
177 Loyola Marymount Economics Seminar Series 7
178 Ohio Economics Seminar 3
180 New Mexico Graduate Seminars 1
181 North Dakota Economic Seminar Series 10
184 Lafayette College No seminar series
185 Texas Christian No seminar series
186* St. Louis
187 Lehigh Department of Economics Seminar Series 6
188 Colby College Seminars 7
189 Northern Illinois Economics Seminar Series 13
190 Cal. State-Northridge No seminar series
191 North Dakota State No seminar series
193 Old Dominion No seminar series
194 Richmond No seminar series
195 Dayton No seminar series
196 Kenyon College No seminar series
197 Akron No seminar series in 2018
198 Washington and Lee W&L/VMI Seminars 7
199 Air Force Academy No seminar series
200 Portland State Economics Seminar Series 10
202 Gettysburg College No seminar series
203* Queens College Not available
204* Missouri-St. Louis Not available
205 Saint Cloud State No seminar series
206* Smith College Not available
207 Barnard College No seminar series
208 Chapman No seminar series
209* Clark University Not available
210 Bowling Green No seminar series
212 Southern Mississippi No seminar series
218 Bucknell No seminar series
219 Toledo Economics Department Speaker Series 4
221 Kennesaw State Coles Seminar Series 12
222 Louisiana Tech No seminar series
223 Rhodes College No seminar series
224 Central Arkansas No seminar series
226 Western Kentucky No seminar series
227 New School No seminar series
228 Kent State No seminar series
Continued on the next page
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229 Louisville No seminar series
230 Texas State No seminar series
231 Rochester Tech Gosnell Lecture Series 1
232 Central Michigan No seminar series
233 Northern Iowa No seminar series
234 Bates College Seminars 13
236 San Jose State Economics Workshop 4
237 U.S. Military Academy No seminar series
239 Seton Hall No seminar series
240 Vassar No seminar series
Not available: The departments’ web does not provide information about research seminars in 2018; it provides partial
information; or, it is not clear whether seminars are related to the economics department. *= No information on faculty.
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Table 3: Probability to invite and accept. Scholar quality measured by the number of citations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Own scholar
excluded
RePEc Active hosts
&presenters
Female
fields
Probability to invite
Scholar quality 0.154a 0.163a 0.153a 0.013 0.205a
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) (0.058)
Department size 0.636a 0.574a 0.738a 0.201b 0.858b
(0.147) (0.150) (0.133) (0.096) (0.368)
Female -0.128b -0.125b -0.075 -0.176c -0.231b
(0.060) (0.063) (0.051) (0.093) (0.110)
Distance -0.091a -0.092a -0.101a -0.036c -0.141a
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.029)
Own scholar 0.381a 0.397a 0.492a 0.268
(0.112) (0.103) (0.188) (0.235)
Career age -0.025a -0.026a -0.025a -0.011a -0.033a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Coauthor 0.254a 0.409a 0.305a -0.224c 0.245b
(0.072) (0.071) (0.058) (0.122) (0.118)
Probability to accept
Department’s quality 0.673a 0.674a 1.321a 0.152 0.481a
(0.064) (0.065) (0.203) (0.099) (0.074)
Female 0.151 0.153 -0.066 0.253c 0.159
(0.119) (0.116) (0.127) (0.144) (0.151)
Distance -0.203a -0.202a -0.191a -0.050 -0.189a
(0.031) (0.030) (0.045) (0.054) (0.028)
Own department 0.463 0.302 8.051a -0.141
(0.448) (0.415) (0.280) (0.290)
Career age -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.011b -0.010b
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Coauthor 1.133b 1.113a 2.247b 1.471 0.541c
(0.495) (0.284) (1.071) (1.158) (0.290)
Log Pseudolikelihood -7367.937 -6836.702 -6629.836 -5778.819 -2129.087
Observations 397120 395459 184960 68295 88409
Test ρ=0 7.704 12.806 10.277 5.448 7.332
Note: Constants are not reported. Standard errors clustered at the scholar level are in parentheses. a, b, c:
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
27
Table 4: Univariate probit. Probability of holding a seminar
(1) (2)
Affiliation Citations
Presenter’s quality 0.228a 0.109a
(0.009) (0.011)
Department’s quality 0.270a 0.278a
(0.010) (0.012)
Department size 0.063 0.127
(0.102) (0.119)
Female 0.013 -0.047
(0.029) (0.035)
Distance -0.107a -0.121a
(0.008) (0.009)
Own scholar 0.586a 0.407a
(0.065) (0.081)
Coauthor 0.393a
(0.055)
Career age -0.019a
(0.002)
Log Pseudolikelihood -9899.745 -7434.897
Observations 708538 397120
Note: Constants are not reported. Standard errors clustered at the scholar level are in parentheses. a, b, c:
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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